[atifmutlaq]

هذا الجزء الثاني من السؤال الشرقي الكلاسيكي

الجزء الثاني
The pervasiveness of the Pattern ( a middle Eastern regional sub-system integrated into the european state system in away that tightly restricted independent middle Eastern political activity ) is further revealed by a seeming paradox : Ottoman military strength or weakness , Ottoman military victories or losses , had in many cases slight bearing on the outcome of events . Or , at times they seemed to have perversely opposite results. The Ottoman armies were twice routed by Muhammad Ali's forces in the 1830s , but European diplomatic activity denied Muhammad Ali the fruits of his victories and left the militarily prostrate Ottoman Empire in a stronger position.

On the other hand , the Ottoman fought well in the crimean war ( relatively speaking , for no armies fought well in that classic example of diplomatic and military bungling ) , but emerged none the stronger for their efforts .

Or , in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 the Ottoman fielded an efficient army, and at Plevna ( now Plevna in Bulgaria ) the Ottoman commander , Osman pasha , conducted a brilliant operation that held off the Russian army , throwing back three attacks , for a crucial half year . Yet the heroic stand at Plevna may well not have helped the Ottomans . Russia probably did not dare arouse the European opposition than her marching into Constantinople would surely have provoked . And did Russia early seek to liquidate the Ottoman Empire at that time? Would a less effective Ottoman military defense during the months of July-December 1877 have stimulated a more effective European diplomatic riposte , sufficient to say Russia's hand ? The experience of the century before 1877 suggests the poignant irony that the Ottomans might have won more at the conference table by losing more on the ground .

the heroic efforts of Osman Pasha and his men left only a I proud legend and the bitter dregs of a draconian peace settle I ment . The Ottoman Empire was " forced to give up two-fifths of its entire territory and one-fifth of its population, about 5.5 million people , of whom almost half were Muslims. No one in Europe ( or even in the middle East , except for the Ottoman Uling elite itself ) had an interest in reconstituting the Ottoman Empire . If it fell, it would not be put back together . All parties acted on the assumption that the trend was irreversible . Ottoman losses would not be recovered , but Ottoman gains-if permitted at all-were not secure against later loss